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Abstract This paper investigates the interaction between stock price
movement and REIT earnings management. We examine
whether information generated from stock price volatility
inﬂuences managers’ incentives to engage in earnings
management. Consistent with the efﬁcient markets hypothesis,
we ﬁnd that suspected earnings-management ﬁrms do not appear
to be more mispriced than others. In addition, using idiosyncratic
volatility as a measure of private information embedded in stock
price, we ﬁnd that negative real earnings management, which
allows REITs to circumvent the mandatory dividend payout
requirement, is associated with greater information embedded in
REIT stock prices. The result implies that information contained
in stock price volatility motivates REIT managers to more
actively avoid regulatory costs.
The inﬂuence of stock investors on corporate decisions has stimulated considerable
scrutiny in the corporate ﬁnance literature. Stock investors express their view of
a ﬁrm’s future prospects via stock trading. As one of the bonding and monitoring
mechanisms described by Fama and Jensen (1983, p. 313), ‘‘stock prices are
visible signals that summarize the implications of internal decisions for current
and future net cash ﬂows. This external monitoring exerts pressure to orient a
corporation’s decision process toward the interests of residual claimants.’’
Consistent with the monitoring role of stock investors, many empirical studies
document that stock prices react to corporate decisions (Jensen, 1986; Lang,
Poulsen, and Stulz, 1995; and Yermack, 1996). In general, abnormal stock returns
tend to be positive when decisions made by managers are aligned with
shareholders’ interest, and negative if otherwise.
In addition to the monitoring role of stock investors, recent studies also suggest
that stock investors may have an information role. Private information regarding
ﬁrm fundamental values is capitalized into stock prices via stock trading. This
information, which might be previously unknown to managers, is revealed via
stock trading patterns and can impact managerial decision-making. In other words,
stock prices change in response to management decisions and from actively
generated information. The monitoring and information roles of stock investors
combine to promote corporate decisions that maximize shareholders’ wealth.102  Ambrose and Bian
While numerous studies show that investor trading activity impacts corporate
decisions, the effects on earnings management have received limited attention.1
We ﬁll this gap by focusing on the interaction between stock price movement and
earnings management to resolve two questions: Are stock investors able to detect
earnings management and understand its consequence? And, more importantly,
how do changes in stock prices affect manager incentives to perform earnings
management? Our research questions are important for a number of reasons.
Studying the connection between stock price movement and earnings management
poses a more rigorous test on the efﬁcient market hypothesis. Unlike most other
corporate decisions, such as investment and ﬁnancing activities, earnings
management decisions are not publicly announced. Thus, to discover earnings
management, stock investors need to have substantial knowledge about accounting
standards, tax rules, and the company’s underlying business activities. Moreover,
because earnings management often involves complicated inter-temporal tradeoffs,
it is challenging to understand the implication of earnings managements on current
and future ﬁrm performance. Thus, by studying earnings management, we test
investor ability to synthesize and price information.
Investor ability to price earnings management impacts the incentives for
management to engage in earnings manipulation. If earnings management is
indiscernible to investors, then information asymmetries may arise and hinder
efﬁcient corporate decisions. For instance, the desire for higher share prices may
push managers to sacriﬁce growth potential in order to boost current earnings. If
investors do not detect this manipulation, then they are unable to perform their
monitoring and information roles, creating a source of market incompleteness. On
the other hand, if the stock market is efﬁcient, then informed investors will see
through earnings management and correctly price shares. Thus, the incentive for
managers to deceive investors via overstated earnings may be removed.2
The answers to these research questions may differ with respect to the types of
earnings management. Thus, we focus on earnings management in two different
dimensions. First, earnings may be manipulated in positive and negative directions.
While inﬂated earnings appear to be a more common issue covered by academic
research and news media, negative earnings management may also exist. In
addition, earnings manipulation can occur through accruals management and real
earnings management (REM). Each possesses distinct features that may impact
investors differently and trigger asymmetric responses. Thus, we study both
dimensions to gain a comprehensive understanding of managers’ motivations to
obscure true economic performance.
We use a sample of real estate investment trusts (REITs) to study these questions.
The use of REIT data enables a richer understanding of our research questions
due to the potential payoffs associated with positive and negative earnings
management. For example, the mandatory dividend payout requirement of REITs
creates an incentive to report lower proﬁts. To maintain their favorable tax status,
REITs must pay out 90% of their taxable income.3 Manipulating incomeStock Market Information and REIT Earnings  103
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downward reduces the required dividend payout. Edelstein, Liu, and Tsang (2007)
ﬁnd that REITs often employ earning-reducing manipulations to meet this
regulatory dividend constraint. However, the motivation for REIT managers to
undertake such an action remains unclear, and so does its implications on
shareholder wealth. If reducing dividends exacerbates agency problems such as
empire building and perquisite consumptions, then negative earnings management
could harm shareholders. Alternatively, if cash is retained as ﬁnancial slack and
used for investment in positive net present value (NPV) projects, then ﬁrm value
may rise due to a decline in regulatory costs. The efﬁcient market hypothesis
implies that stock investors can foresee the consequences of such actions.
Therefore, if negative earnings management harms shareholders’ interests, then it
should be limited by their monitoring activity. On the other hand, if negative
earnings management is used to decrease regulatory cost, then it should be
promoted.
We turn to the accounting literature for methods of identifying ﬁrms that perform
accruals management and REM. We examine whether stock investors have
sufﬁcient information to price earnings management by comparing a measure of
stock-price informativeness, which is deﬁned as the amount of information about
future earnings contained in current stock prices, across suspected earnings
management (EM) ﬁrms and non-earnings management (non-EM) ﬁrms. If stock
investors are unable to identify earnings management, then managers could take
advantage of uninformed investors by manipulating current period earnings
through deceptive earnings announcements and/or sub-optimal operations.
Alternatively, if information about earnings management is captured by investors,
then stock-price informativeness should be similar across all ﬁrms. In this case,
the market efﬁciency hypothesis is supported. The monitoring role and information
role of investors should promote earnings management practices that maximize
shareholders’ interests and discourage those that do not.
Our empirical results conﬁrm the efﬁcient market hypothesis: we ﬁnd that stock
price informativeness is not systematically different between suspected EM
ﬁrms and non-EM ﬁrms. This result is robust for two different stock price
informativeness measures, and indicates that investors appear to detect and
price earnings management. No evidence suggests that signiﬁcant information
asymmetry is attributable to earnings management. Hence, the monitoring and
information roles of investors are likely to be effective and lead to earnings being
reported in a way that maximizes shareholders’ wealth.
We further inquire into the feedback effects of information embedded in stock
price volatility on earnings management. We examine the association between
earnings management and information embedded in stock prices to see if this
information can in fact inﬂuence earnings management. We adopt idiosyncratic
stock return volatility as a measure of private information contained in stock
prices. Greater idiosyncratic volatility represents more private information being
capitalized into stock prices. With greater transparency and scrutiny, the104  Ambrose and Bian
monitoring and information functions of investors should be stronger. If earnings
management is positively correlated with idiosyncratic volatility, it is more likely
to be aligned with shareholders’interests. A negative relation implies that earnings
management adversely affects shareholders’interests and may be limited via either
more effective monitoring or better information.
We ﬁnd that idiosyncratic stock return volatility has a strong positive correlation
with negative REM. This result supports the hypothesis that negative REM may
increase ﬁrm value through greater retained earnings to overcome future ﬁnancial
constraints. Negative REM reduces regulatory costs by providing a back door for
REITs to circumvent the mandatory payout requirements.
To our knowledge, no prior study has examined the relation between stock price
volatility and positive and negative earnings management. Our study contributes
to the literature in multiple dimensions. First, we contribute to the ﬁnance
literature examining market efﬁciency by showing that stock price volatility is not
associated with greater information asymmetry. Instead, stock investors are aware
of earnings management and its consequence, and the monitoring and information
roles of investors induce earnings manipulation to be performed in a way that is
aligned with shareholders’ interests.
Second, our study also contributes to the accounting and ﬁnance literature by
examining the interaction between stock price movement and negative earnings
management. In contrast to previous earnings management literature, we provide
evidence that negative earnings management may in fact beneﬁt REIT
shareholders.
Finally, we contribute to the real estate literature by addressing the ongoing debate
of whether or not equity securitization of real estate portfolios through the REIT
structure adds value by allowing information regarding portfolio management
investment decisions to be processed more efﬁciently. We show that negative
earnings management, which provides ﬂexibility for REITs to choose their
dividend payout ratio, appears to be consistent with shareholders’ interests. The
positive correlation between negative earnings management and idiosyncratic
stock return volatility implies that REIT stock prices are informative. As a result,
we show that stock price volatility enhances managerial efﬁciency.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the research hypotheses in
a greater detail. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Section
4 discusses the various proxies used for determining the presence of earnings
management. Section 5 describes the procedure used to estimate embedded
information in stock prices. Section 5 addresses the question of whether investors
can detect earnings management. Section 7 follows by answering the question of
how stock price movements impact earnings management. Section 8 discusses
various robustness checks and concluding remarks are presented in Section 9.Stock Market Information and REIT Earnings  105
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 Hypotheses Development and Background
Earnings Management
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368), ‘‘earnings management occurs
when managers use judgment in ﬁnancial reporting and in structuring transactions
to alter ﬁnancial reports to either mislead some stake holders about the underlying
economic performance of the company or to inﬂuence contractual outcomes that
depend on reported accounting numbers.’’ Several motivations may drive earnings
management. First, earnings management may affect stock prices. It may be the
case that the manager/entrepreneur intends to take advantage of uninformed
shareholders. Overstating earnings may bring higher proceeds in initial public
offers (IPOs) (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a), seasoned equity offers (SEOs)
(Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998b), and stock ﬁnanced acquisitions (Teoh, Wong,
and Rao, 1998). On the other hand, ‘‘modest’’ earning reports reduce cash outlays
for management buyouts (DeAngelo, 1988) and stock repurchases (Gong, Louis,
and Sun, 2008). Moreover, earnings management may also help managers meet
analyst forecasts (Burgstahler and Eames, 2006). In general, information
asymmetry appears to be the key that drives earnings management. However,
agency cost is not the only reason behind earnings manipulation. Rather, as
Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2005) point out, earnings manipulation can be
a result of conﬂict between current and new shareholders. This argument is
supported by a series of studies that show that traditional corporate governance
devices, such as concentrated ownership and smaller boards, are associated with
more earnings management (Yu, 2005).
Second, earnings management may also impact contractual outcomes, such as
management’s incentive to maximize their compensation. For example, managers
are more likely to defer realization of revenue when there is a cap to their
compensation (Healy, 1985; Holthausen, Larcker, and Sloan, 1995; and Guidry,
Leone, and Rock, 1999). In addition, Dechow and Sloan (1991) ﬁnd that CEOs
often reduce research and development expenditure to boost income during their
ﬁnal year in ofﬁce. Other empirical evidence indicates that managers use earnings
management to avoid the violation of debt covenants (Healy and Palepu, 1990;
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner, 1994; and DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994).
Finally, earnings management may allow ﬁrms to increase regulatory beneﬁts or
to decrease regulatory costs. For example, a number of studies show that banks
that are close to minimum capital requirements overstate loan loss provisions,
understate loan write-offs, and recognize abnormal realized gain on securities
portfolios. Also, ﬁrms that are vulnerable to anti-trust investigation, adverse
political consequences, or facing tax issues may have an incentive to appear less
proﬁtable.4
One of the central debates in the earnings management literature is whether or
not investors are able to see through earnings management. Much of the evidence106  Ambrose and Bian
seems to suggest that investors are not ‘‘fooled’’ by earnings management. For
example, Hand (1993) ﬁnds that ﬁrms have tax incentives to adopt LIFO during
periods with increasing input prices and stock investors appear to comprehend this
intention by positively pricing ﬁrms’unexpected LIFO tax beneﬁts. Also, evidence
suggests that stock investors interpret ‘‘abnormal’’ accruals more cautiously than
‘‘normal’’ accruals (Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson, 1989; Wahlen, 1994; and
Beaver and Engel, 1996). From the shareholders’perspective, ‘‘abnormal’’accruals
are likely a reﬂection of earnings manipulation. However, other empirical studies
point out that investors may be unable to perfectly understand earnings
management. The poor long-run performance of ﬁrms with overstated earnings
before IPOs and SEOs seems to support this view (Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a,
1998b).
Earnings management is segregated into two types, accruals management and real
earnings management (REM), based on whether or not ﬁrm economic activities
are affected. Accruals management does not alter a ﬁrm’s economic activities, it
only involves choosing accounting methods that disguise proﬁtability. REM occurs
when managers mask true economic performance operationally. While both types
affect book income (income reported to shareholders), the special tie between
taxable income (income reported to U.S. Internal Revenue Service) and REIT
dividend payment differentiates the capital market consequences of these two
forms of earnings manipulation. Speciﬁcally, accruals management represents
managerial bias that results when managers opportunistically exercise discretion
in applying accounting rules. As suggested by recent accounting research, tax rules
allow managers less discretion in determining taxable income than GAAP allows
in determining book income. Thus, accruals management mainly affects book
income, and to a lesser degree, taxable income (Hein and Kross, 2005). Since
REIT mandatory dividend payout is determined by taxable income, accruals
management may not be as effective as REM in reducing dividend payout.
Stock Market Information
As deﬁned by Tobin (1982), a functionally efﬁcient stock market should facilitate
efﬁcient resource allocation by capitalizing all information into security prices.
Existing literature indicates that an efﬁcient stock market may promote efﬁcient
resource allocation through two distinct channels. First, as articulated by Fama
and Jensen (1983), the stock market serves as one of the bonding and monitoring
mechanisms that limits agency problem. Stock prices react positively to events
that are beneﬁcial to shareholders’ interests and negatively to events that are not.
The incentive for obtaining high stock prices should motivate managers to make
decisions that are aligned with shareholder’s interests. Obviously, the effectiveness
of this monitoring function strongly relies on the assumption that stock investors
are sufﬁciently informed, and that they can comprehend the implications of those
events on their wealth. An array of empirical studies show that stock prices react
to various corporate decisions in a way that is consistent with this monitoring
function. For example, stock prices are sensitive to capital structure changesStock Market Information and REIT Earnings  107
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(Jensen, 1986), changes in board composition and structure (Yermack, 1996; Fich
and Shivdasani, 2006; and Faleye, 2007), and the sale of assets (Lang, Poulsen,
and Stulz, 1995).
In addition to its monitoring role, several recent studies suggest that the stock
market may also promote efﬁcient corporate decisions via its information role.
For example, Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999)
suggest that information embedded in stock price movements provide managers
with additional feedback about their ﬁrm. Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) ﬁnd
that more private information embedded in stock prices is associated with greater
ﬁrm responsiveness to investment opportunities. Their result implies that stock
trading is useful and conveys private information that is previously unknown to
managers.
We investigate the aggregate impact of stock price volatility on earnings
management. If stock price movements simply reﬂect noise trading, then it is hard
to establish any meaningful relation between stock price movements and earnings
management. Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) show that stock price
volatility is not just a reﬂection of random noises, rather, it reﬂects information
about ﬁrm fundamentals. That is, ﬁrms with more private information embedded
in their stock prices have their future earnings more closely forecasted by current
stock prices. Other related studies include Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000), who
indicate that nations with superior protection on investors’ private property rights
promote informed arbitrage. Thus, more private information is embedded in stock
prices in those countries. In general, capital allocations appear to be more efﬁcient
when greater information is impounded into stock prices. Empirical evidence
supporting this view exists at the country-, industry-, as well as ﬁrm-level
(Wurgler, 2000; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004; and Ambrose and Lee, 2008).
Finally, more embedded information also leads to a stronger linkage between CEO
turnover and ﬁrm performance (DeFond and Hung, 2004).
If ﬁrms are different in terms of the amount of information embedded in their
stock prices, it is then reasonable to expect the monitoring and information
function of the stock market to be stronger for ﬁrms with more embedded private
information. This is because investors are equipped with more information to
analyze the implication of corporate decisions, and feedback of this information
through stock trading may help managers make better decisions. Thus, greater
stock market information should be negatively correlated with earnings
management if it is detrimental to shareholders’ interest, and should be positively
correlated with it, otherwise.
REIT Industry
In our analysis, we utilize data on REITs to examine the role of stock market
volatility on earnings management. REITs are constrained by a minimum dividend
payout policy (at least 90% of taxable income). This special feature is crucial to108  Ambrose and Bian
our study for two reasons. First, this mandatory dividend payout policy results in
REITs paying out a much larger percentage of their earnings than regular ﬁrms.
This may imply that REITs are more likely to have insufﬁcient ﬁnancial slack, a
valuable input when external ﬁnancing is costly. For example, equity ﬁnancing
may be costly because of the asymmetric information problem characterized by
Myers and Majluf (1984). In addition, debt ﬁnancing may also be undesirable due
to the risk-shifting or debt overhang problems.5 Thus, to avoid being deprived of
ﬁnancial slack, it may be optimal for REITs to manage their earnings downward.
On the other hand, the mandatory payout policy also requires that REITs
frequently return to the capital market to raise external funds. This process
provides outside investors with additional opportunities to collect information.
According to Easterbrook (1984), existing equity investors suffer from the problem
of collective action and often impose too little monitoring on managers. Thus,
frequently raising new capital subjects managers’ performance to regular scrutiny
from new investors, who are immune from the collective action problem. This
recurrent evaluation should motivate managers to reduce organizational
inefﬁciency in order to collect the highest price for their new instruments. Thus,
one would expect more meaningful and inﬂuential information to be embedded
in stock trading and improve REIT organizational efﬁciency.
Research Hypotheses
We conduct two tests in this study. First, we examine whether earnings
management generates information asymmetry. We approach this problem by
comparing stock-price informativeness between suspected EM ﬁrms and non-EM
ﬁrms. In a frictionless ﬁnancial market, current stock returns should reﬂect future
earnings. We measure stock-price informativeness based on the explanatory power
of future earnings on current stock return, where greater explanatory power
indicates that stock prices track ﬁrm fundamentals more closely. Because earnings
management is likely to obscure a ﬁrm’s true economic performance and,
therefore, create obstacles for its shares to be correctly valued, we expect EM
ﬁrms, ceteris paribus, to exhibit lower stock informativeness than non-EM ﬁrms.
Second, we examine if greater market information leads to more or less earnings
management. Following previous literature, we use idiosyncratic stock return
volatility as a measure of embedded information. Then we regress our earnings
management measures on idiosyncratic stock return volatility while controlling
for other factors that may impact earnings management. We examine this relation
separately for positive earnings management and negative earnings management
to capture the potentially different motivations behind them.
Putting these tests together enables us to pinpoint three hypotheses concerning
motivations for REIT managers to engage in earnings management. First, if
earnings management generates asymmetric information, then a positive
relationship between inﬂated earnings and embedded information impliesStock Market Information and REIT Earnings  109
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managers face pressure to meet misguided market expectations. Thus, a REIT
manager, aiming to maximize his own interests, has an incentive to be
‘‘bombastic’’ in order to maximize his compensation or secure his job. We call
this the agency cost hypothesis.
Second, based on the potential monitoring function of stock investors, we
formulate the monitoring hypothesis. Yu (2008) ﬁnds that analyst coverage serves
as an external monitoring device that reduces earnings management. We are
interested in whether or not embedded information in stock prices has a similar
function. If so, we would expect that EM ﬁrms are not systematically mispriced,
and stock market information reduces earnings management (both positive and
negative). The implications of this hypothesis are two-fold. First, stock investors
are informed and able to incorporate earnings management into stock prices.
Second, market scrutiny improves accounting transparency.
Finally, greater embedded information may be associated with negative REM. This
relationship is more likely when earnings management does not create signiﬁcant
information asymmetry. If stock investors are unaware of earnings management,
then managers may be penalized for understating ﬁrm performance. However, if
information asymmetry is low, then information transmitted via trading activity
may motivate managers to more actively reduce regulatory costs via ‘‘modest
earnings reports’’ that allow for more ﬂexibility on dividend policy. Thus, this
regulatory cost hypothesis implies that stock-price informativeness should not be
systematically different between EM and non-EM ﬁrms, and negative REM should
be positively correlated with embedded information. As illustrated in Exhibit 1,
each of these hypotheses yield testable predictions about the potential differences
in stock-price informativeness between EM ﬁrms and non-EM ﬁrms, as well as
the relation between stock market information and earnings management.
 Data and Sample Selection
We construct our data set starting with all publicly traded REITs covered in the
SNL REIT database during the 1990–2006 period.6 We use stock trading data
from CRSP to compute idiosyncratic volatility. We require each REIT to have at
least 45 weeks of trading for a given year and accounting data available from
either Standard & Poor’s annual Compustat tapes or SNL for the estimations of
earnings management. To estimate earnings management, we assign each REIT
to a property-type group based on its investment focus, and we require each
property type to consist of at least 10 observations.7 To estimate stock-price
informativeness, we also require each REIT to have at least six years of accounting
data during the sample period. When forming portfolios based on earnings
management, we also ensure that each EM portfolio consists of at least 10
observations. Because the SNL REIT sample is small in the early years, we start
with year 1996, which allows our analysis to cover years 1999 through 2006.8
Our ﬁnal sample contains 655 ﬁrm-year observations covering 104 unique REITs.110  Ambrose and Bian
Exhibit 1  Predictions of the Hypothesis
Correlation between
Embedded Information &
Earnings Management Systematic Difference in
Stock-Price Informativeness
Quintiles Positive EM Negative EM
Agency Cost Hypothesis Yes 
Monitoring Hypothesis No 
Regulatory Cost Hypothesis No 
Notes: This table summarizes the empirical predictions of the three alternative hypotheses tested in
this paper with regard to the stock informativeness across EM and non-EM ﬁrms and the
relationship between stock market information and earnings management. The agency cost
hypothesis argues that information asymmetry between shareholders and manager provides
incentive for managers to overstate earnings. The monitoring hypothesis argues that as a
monitoring mechanism, more stock market information reduces earnings management. The
regulatory cost hypothesis argues that greater market information motivates managers to actively
reduce regulatory cost via negative earnings management.
 Estimation of Earnings Management
Accruals Management
Book earnings consist of cash ﬂow and accounting adjustments called accruals.
Manager judgment often plays a critical role in determining accruals. Thus, we
measure accruals management by focusing on discretionary accruals (DAs), which
are estimated using a modiﬁed version of the Jones model (Dechow, Sloan, and
Sweeney, 1995).9
To determine DA, we begin by estimating an annual OLS regression of total
accruals (TA) for each REIT property type:
TA REV PPE 1 i,t i,t i,t         , (1) 12 3 i,t AA A A i,t1 i,t1 i,t1 i,t1
where TAi,t is total accruals for REIT i in year t (deﬁned as net income minus
cash ﬂow from operations), REVi,t is the change in sales revenues for REIT i
from year t  1 to year t, and PPEi,t is gross property, plant, and equipment for
REIT i in year t. We scale all the variables by the lagged total assets (Ai,t1). UsingStock Market Information and REIT Earnings  111
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the estimated regression coefﬁcients from (1), we calculate non-discretionary
accruals (NDAs) as:
REV AR PPE 1 i,t i,t i,t NDA  ˆ   ˆ   ˆ  , (2)  i,t 12 3 AA AA i,t1 i,t1 i,t1 i,t1
where ARi,t is the change in accounts receivables for REIT i from year t  1t o
year t, and and are the estimated coefﬁcients. We then compute DAi,t ˆ  ,ˆ  ,ˆ  12 3
as the difference between TAi,t and NDAi,t:10
TAi,t DA  NDA . (3) i,t Ai,t1
Larger values of DAi,t indicate a higher probability of earnings-increasing
manipulation, while ﬁrms with smaller DAi,t are more likely managing earnings
downward.
Real Earnings Management
We use three proxies for real earnings management (REM). recognizing that
managers are able to manage a company’s earnings by manipulating revenues,
costs, and sales of assets.11 Previous studies of earnings management use
regression models to estimate normal levels of business activities (e.g., revenue,
production cost, and R&D) within an industry. The deviations from these
estimated normal levels are then likely the result of real earnings management
and, therefore, are used as proxies for REM activities. Thus, we estimate the
following linear model:
REV REV 1 i,t1 i,t1 REV         , (4) i,t 12 3 i,t AA A i,t1 i,t1 i,t1
where the dependent variable REVi,t is the revenue for REIT i in year t. We express
REVi,t as a function of previous year’s revenue (REVi,t1) and the change in revenue
from the previous year (REVi,t1). All variables are scaled by lagged total assets.
The abnormal revenue, ABREVi,t, is simply the prediction error.
Similarly, we estimate the normal level of expense via the linear model based on
revenue generation:112  Ambrose and Bian
REV REV 1 i,t i,t COGS       i,t 12 3 AA A i,t1 i,t1 i,t1
REVi,t1     , (5) 4 i,t Ai,t1
where COGSi,t is the cost of goods sold of REIT i in year t, and REVi,t is revenue
of current period. We also include the changes in revenue from current and
previous years.12 Thus, abnormal cost, ABCOGSi,t, is the prediction error of (5).
Equations (4) and (5) are estimated annually for each REIT property type to
determine the normal levels of revenue and cost. Large abnormal revenues and/
or small abnormal costs are more likely a result of earning-increasing REM. In
contrast, small abnormal revenues and/or large abnormal costs are more likely a
result of earning-decreasing REM.
Finally, ﬁrms may manage their earnings via asset sales. Edelstein, Liu, and Tsang
(2007) indicate that managers may be tempted to report a loss on the sale of ﬁxed
assets when their dividend constraint is binding. Following Edelstein et al. (2007),
we include the accounting gain or loss for the sale of real estate assets (scaled by
lagged total assets), GOSREi,t, as a measure of REM. Large (small) gains or losses
on the sale of real estate assets are more likely a result of earning-increasing
(earning-decreasing) REM.
To reduce potential bias caused by outliers, we winsorize these four EM measures
at the tails of 0.5% and 99.5%. Following Gunny (2005), we deﬁne positive
(negative) EM ﬁrms as observations in the top (bottom) quintiles of DAi,t,
ABREVi,t, and GOSREi,t and the bottom (top) quintile of ABCOGSi,t. Exhibit 2
shows the descriptive statistics for the EM quintiles. We ﬁnd no systematic
difference in ﬁrm size, earnings volatility or stock returns.
 Estimation of Embedded Information in Stock Prices
We use idiosyncratic stock return volatility as a measure of private information.
This measure was ﬁrst introduced by Roll (1988) to isolate idiosyncratic stock
price volatility from stock price variation attributable to market-related and
industry-related factors. The author suggests that the low R2 statistics resulting
from estimation of common Capital Asset Pricing Models (CAPM), ‘‘seems to
imply the existence of either private information or else occasional frenzy
unrelated to concrete information,’’ (Roll, 1988, p. 566). Subsequent studies show
that the capitalization of private information appears to be a more plausible answer
to the question proposed by Roll. Stock return synchronicity is consistently shown
to enhance market efﬁciency. For example, Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin
(2003) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with greater ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock return volatility have ﬁrmStock Market Information and REIT Earnings  113
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Exhibit 2  Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Panel A: EM quintiles based on DA
FERC 2.951 2.975 0.000 10.422
FINC 0.401 0.204 0.109 0.912
Number of ﬁrms 17.567 2.473 13.000 22.000
Average ﬁrm size 12.102 0.332 11.407 12.587
E 0.035 0.020 0.017 0.098
EPDIV 0.349 0.256 0.024 0.911
Annual stock return 0.077 0.194 0.221 0.515
Panel B: EM quintiles based on ABREV
FERC 3.044 2.607 0.000 8.219
FINC 0.430 0.215 0.081 0.795
Number of ﬁrms 18.233 3.245 11.000 23.000
Average ﬁrm size 12.073 0.561 10.528 13.080
E 0.037 0.019 0.005 0.087
EPDIV 0.334 0.255 0.023 0.969
Annual stock return 0.069 0.188 0.228 0.379
Panel C: EM quintiles based on ABCOGS
FERC 3.199 2.867 0.000 10.220
FINC 0.357 0.199 0.046 0.764
Number of ﬁrms 18.233 3.401 10.000 24.000
Average ﬁrm size 12.054 0.401 11.157 12.701
E 0.037 0.022 0.012 0.097
EPDIV 0.316 0.227 0.024 0.815
Annual stock return 0.071 0.193 0.274 0.417
Panel D: EM quintiles based on GOSRE
FERC 3.193 3.229 0.000 13.157
FINC 0.369 0.196 0.037 0.780
Number of ﬁrms 16.033 1.299 13.000 18.000
Average ﬁrm size 12.105 0.372 11.492 12.946
E 0.037 0.023 0.008 0.098
EPDIV 0.301 0.240 0.014 0.930
Annual stock return 0.073 0.195 0.248 0.418114  Ambrose and Bian
Exhibit 2  (continued)
Descriptive Statistics
Notes: This table presents the descriptive statistics of our stock-price informativeness measure,
FERC and FINC, and control variables included for estimated Equations (12) and (13). Panel A
presents descriptive statistics of EM quintiles constructed using discretionary accruals (DA). Panel B
presents descriptive statistics of EM quintiles constructed using abnormal revenues (ABREV). Panel
C presents descriptive statistics of based on EM quintiles constructed using abnormal cost
(ABCOGS). Panel D presents descriptive statistics of EM quintiles using gain of loss from the sale
of real estate assets. (GOSRE). FERC is sum of the coefﬁcients on future changes in earnings in
regression (9). FINC is the increase of the coefﬁcient of determination of regression (9). Number
of ﬁrms is deﬁned as the number of REITs contained in an EM quintile. Average ﬁrm size is
deﬁned as the logarithm of average inﬂation adjusted total asset of an EM quintile. Past earnings
volatility (E) is deﬁned as the average standard deviation of changes in earnings over the past
three years scaled by the previous year’s stock price of each EM quintile. Future dividend
explanatory power (EPDIV) is deﬁned as the R2 from the regression (14) of changes in current
earnings on changes in current and future dividends. Annual stock return is deﬁned as the
weighted annual return of each EM quintile. There are 30 observations.
fundamentals more closely tracked by their share prices. Other studies ﬁnd that
greater idiosyncratic stock return volatility leads to more efﬁcient resource
allocations (Wurgler, 2000; Durnev, Morck, and Yeung, 2004; Chen, Goldstein,
and Jiang, 2006; and Ambrose and Lee, 2008) and management compensation
(DeFond and Hung, 2004).
Idiosyncratic volatility is deﬁned as the portion of a ﬁrm’s stock return variation
unrelated to market and industry returns, and is obtained by estimating the
following OLS regression:
r     r   r   , (6) j,w,t j,t j,t m,w,t j,t i,w,t j,w,t
where j,w,t is the weekly stock return of ﬁrm j in year t; m,w,t is the corresponding
weekly market return; and i,w,t is the weekly REIT index return. The weekly
market return is the CRSP value-weighted weekly market return and the REIT
index return is the value-weighted average of the REIT weekly stock returns
excluding the ﬁrm in question, that is,
	 r  	 r  k,w,t k,w,t j,w,t j,w,t
ki r  , (7) i,w,t N  1 iStock Market Information and REIT Earnings  115
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where 	k,w,t is the value weight of ﬁrm k in week w of year t, and N is the number
of REITs included in our sample. This exclusion prevents ﬁrms with relatively
large market capitalizations from displaying spurious correlation with the index.
The variance of j,w,t is then scaled by the total variance of j,w,t to form the measure
of relative ﬁrm-speciﬁc return volatility:
2   j,w,t
wt 
  . (8) j,t 2 (r  r )  j,w,t j,w,t
wt
Note that 
j,t is simply 1-R2 from the estimation of Equation (6) and was ﬁrst
introduced by Roll (1988) to isolate idiosyncratic stock price volatility from stock
price variation attributable to market-related and industry-related factors. This
measure has been applied by subsequent theoretical and empirical studies to model
idiosyncratic stock movement (Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin, 2003; Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang, 2006; and Ambrose and Lee, 2008).
 Can Stock Investors Detect Earnings Management?
We empirically examine if stock investors can detect earnings management. If
earnings management is not discernible to stock investors, everything else being
equal, share prices of earnings-managing ﬁrms should reﬂect a biased view of
ﬁrm value and thus exhibit greater deviation from fundamental values. Empirically,
we should see ﬁrms in the middle quintile exhibit superior predictive power on
future earnings than the ﬁrms in the other quintile.
Following Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1994), we construct two
measures of stock price informativeness based on the following regression:
r  a  b E  b E  cr  , (9)  t 0 t  t t t

where Et and Et are the current and future changes in earnings per share,
respectively, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of year t. Following the
recommendation of Collins et al., future stock returns rt are included as control
variables. Equation (9) is estimated for each earnings management quintile and 
is set to two years.13
The ﬁrst measure of stock price informativeness is the future earnings response
coefﬁcient (FERC), computed as the summation of regression coefﬁcients of future
earning changes, that is,116  Ambrose and Bian
FERC  b . (10)  

Collins, Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1994) show that, after controlling for future
returns, a positive b signals that the co-movements of current returns and future
earnings are in the same direction. We truncate b at zero in the case of negative
values.14
The second measure of stock price informativeness is the future earnings
incremental explanatory power (FINC). FINC is the increase in the R2 from the
estimation of Equation (9) associated with the inclusion of future earnings:
22 FINC  R  R . (11) ab E  b E  cr  ab E  0 t  tr t t 0 tt
Both FERC and FINC measure the extent that information about future earnings
are captured by current stock prices. Larger values of FERC and FINC imply
higher stock price informativeness.
Exhibit 2 shows the average values of FERC and FINC across the EM quintiles.
For example, Panel A shows the descriptive statistics for the EM quintiles based
on the accruals management (DA) measure. The average FERC is 2.951, and the
average FINC is 0.401, implying that the regression based on Equation (9) is, on
average, able to explain 40% of the current stock return variation when two years
of future earnings are included. Both FERC and FINC possess considerable
variability across observations. For example, the maximum FINC is 91.2% and
the minimum FINC is 10.9%. The other EM-based quintile groups show
qualitatively similar results.
We test the hypothesis that stock investors are able to detect earnings management
and understand its consequences ﬁrst via the panel regression of FERC and FINC
on dummy variables of EM quintiles:
FERC       Z   (12)  ii kk i , t
ik
and
FINC       Z   , (13)  ii kk i , t
ikStock Market Information and REIT Earnings  117
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where i are the dummy variables for EM quintiles with the middle quintile being
omitted, Zk is a set of control variables, and i,t is the standard error. Because
FERC is left truncated at zero, Equation (12) is estimated as a Tobit regression,
whereas (13) is estimated as OLS. We reject the hypothesis of no asymmetric
information being produced by earnings management if one or more i are
signiﬁcantly negative.
We include an array of control variables in Zk to rule out alternative explanations,
and control for factors that could potentially affect stock price informativeness.
Following Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003), we control for problems
in variable construction, factors that have an intrinsic effect on the relationship
between returns and earnings, and the effects of earning timeliness.
As pointed out by Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003), FERC and FINC
are more accurately estimated using a large number of ﬁrms. Furthermore, a
number of empirical studies show that earning news is more quickly impounded
into the returns of large ﬁrms relative to the returns of small ﬁrms (Collins,
Kothari, and Rayburn, 1987; Freeman, 1987; and Collins and Kothari, 1989).
Thus, we include the number of ﬁrms and average ﬁrm size of each REIT EM
quintile to control for potential problems in variable construction. Number of ﬁrms
is deﬁned as the number of REITs contained in a EM quintile; average ﬁrm size
is deﬁned as the logarithm of average inﬂation-adjusted total asset of a EM
quintile.
In addition, endogeneity may impact the correlation between current stock returns
and future earnings. For instance, ﬁrms with more volatile past earnings may be
more difﬁcult to analyze, implying the need to control for past earnings volatility,
which is deﬁned as the standard deviation of changes in earnings over the past
three years scaled by the previous year’s stock price. In addition, because
dividends ultimately depend upon earnings, earnings can be interpreted as a signal
of future dividends. However, high current earnings do not necessarily translate
into high future dividends if agency problems exist and manager interests are not
aligned with shareholders. To account for heterogeneity among ﬁrms, we include
future dividend explanatory power, which is deﬁned as the R2 from the regression
of changes in current earnings on changes in current and future dividends:
E  a  b D  b D  , (14)  t 0 t  t t

where Et and Dt respectively are the changes of earning and dividend payout
ratios in year t. To construct future dividend explanatory power, regression (14)
is estimated for each EM quintile (  1, 2).
Finally, ﬁrms may also differ in terms of timeliness of earnings. Firms with less
timely earnings may display a weaker correlation between returns and current118  Ambrose and Bian
earnings but strong correlation between return and future earnings. Hence, the
estimated FERC and FINC tend to be higher for this type of ﬁrm (Durnev, Morck,
Yeung, and Zarowin, 2003). Following previous studies, we utilize annual stock
return, which is deﬁned as the EM-quintile value-weighted return per year, to
control for earning timeliness.15
Exhibit 3 presents the estimated coefﬁcients for the ﬁxed-effect panel regressions
of equations (12) and (13) based on the four EM measures. Because the middle
quintile contains observations with the least likelihood of engaging in earnings
management, it is omitted.16 Thus, the regression coefﬁcients associated with
the quintile dummy variables represent the mean differences of stock-price
informativeness between that quintile and the middle quintile. As shown in Exhibit
3, we do not observe any systematic pattern in the estimated coefﬁcients for the
EM quintiles.17 Hence, we have no evidence to reject the hypothesis that investors
are able to detect earnings management.
 How Does Stock Price Movement Impact Earnings
 Management?
We now proceed to investigate our second research question: how does stock price
movement impact earnings management? We test if stock market generated
feedbacks can inﬂuence earnings management by regressing our EM variables on
idiosyncratic stock return volatility. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following logit
panel regression:
EM    
   Z   , (15)  i,t j,t k k i,t
k
where EMi,t is an binary variable indicating suspected EM ﬁrms, 
 is the
idiosyncratic stock return volatility, and Zk are control variables. EMi,t is
constructed based on the four earnings management proxies (DA, ABREV,
GOSRE, and ABCOGS). We classify REIT i as a positive EM ﬁrm if i’s values
of DAi,t, ABREVi,t,o rGOSREi,t, are in the top quintile, or ABCOGSi,t,i si nt h e
bottom quintile. Similarly, we classify REIT i as a negative EM ﬁrm if i’s values
of DAi,t, ABREVi,t,o rGOSREi,t, are in the bottom quintile, or ABCOGSi,t,i si nt h e
top quintile. With four earnings management proxies, Equation (15) is estimated
using eight alternative identiﬁcations of EM ﬁrms. Exhibit 4 presents the summary
statistics of variables used for estimating equation (15). Because DA, ABREV, and
ABCOGS are ﬁtted residuals, their means are zero by construction. The small
deviation from zero is due to winsorizing.
If stock market information does impact managers’ choice on earnings
management, then we should ﬁnd that the estimated coefﬁcient () is statistically






























































Exhibit 3  Stock-Price Informativeness



















Quintile 1 3.857 0.373 2.218 0.197 1.056 0.037 2.822 0.020
(0.190) (0.110) (0.260) (0.140) (0.660) (0.830) (0.270) (0.900)
Quintile 2 0.830 0.231 2.699 0.069 0.695 0.063 3.504 0.201
(0.670) (0.150) (0.070)* (0.470) (0.660) (0.590) (0.210) (0.230)
Quintile 4 0.739 0.243 1.756 0.044 0.693 0.046 1.041 0.045
(0.690) (0.120) (0.270) (0.680) (0.710) (0.730) (0.540) (0.680)
Quintile 5 1.478 0.384 0.322 0.207 3.494 0.265 1.647 0.052
(0.680) (0.170) (0.870) (0.130) (0.380) (0.360) (0.590) (0.780)
Number of ﬁrms 0.202 0.026 0.431 0.039 0.486 0.018 0.532 0.018
(0.680) (0.490) (0.080)* (0.020)** (0.290) (0.590) (0.530) (0.730)
Average ﬁrm size 1.393 0.147 0.974 0.171 0.904 0.154 0.745 0.170
(0.460) (0.330) (0.410) (0.050)* (0.640) (0.280) (0.750) (0.260)
E 27.658 4.874 35.665 1.850 23.353 1.283 21.062 0.546
(0.370) (0.060)* (0.230) (0.350) (0.460) (0.580) (0.720) (0.870)
EPDIV 8.157 0.071 3.392 0.131 3.183 0.164 0.750 0.476
(0.000)*** (0.670) (0.160) (0.410) (0.330) (0.490) (0.850) (0.070)*
Annual stock return 3.322 0.291 3.481 1.118 9.015 0.218 8.874 0.468
(0.430) (0.400) (0.450) 0.000 (0.070)* (0.530) (0.090)* (0.160)
Intercept 19.501 1.597 23.336 3.083 16.367 1.971 12.432 2.202


















Exhibit 3  (continued)
Stock-Price Informativeness



















Year-ﬁxed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2/Pseudo R2 0.168 0.534 0.103 0.745 0.074 0.499 0.128 0.563
Notes: This table presents the regression of stock-price informativeness measure, FERC and FINC, on dummy variables of EM quintiles. Column 1 and 2
show results with EM quintiles being constructed with discretionary accruals (DA). Column 3 and 4 show results with EM quintiles being constructed with
abnormal revenues (ABREV). Column 5 and 6 show results with EM quintiles being constructed with abnormal cost (ABCOGS). Column 7 and 8 show results
with EM quintiles being constructed with gain of loss from the sale of real estate assets (GOSRE). FERC is sum of the coefﬁcients on future changes in
earnings in regression (9). FINC is the increase of the coefﬁcient of determination of regression (9). Number of ﬁrms is deﬁned as the number of REITs
contained in an EM quintile. Average ﬁrm size is deﬁned as the logarithm of average inﬂation adjusted total asset of an EM quintile. Past earnings volatility
(E) is deﬁned as the average standard deviation of changes in earnings over the past three years scaled by the previous year’s stock price of each EM
quintile. Future dividend explanatory power (EPDIV) is deﬁned as the R2 from the regression (14) of changes in current earnings on changes in current and
future dividends. Annual stock return is deﬁned as the weighted annual return of each EM quintile. p-values are shown in parentheses below each regression
coefﬁcient. There are 30 observations.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Stock Market Information and REIT Earnings  121
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Exhibit 4  Descriptive Statistics of the Sample
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
DA 616 0.0001 0.0292 0.1717 0.1554
ABREV 637 0.0014 0.0588 0.5604 0.5623
ABCOGS 637 0.0038 0.0272 0.1819 0.1388
GOSRE 630 0.0047 0.0122 0.0052 0.1167
Idiosyncratic volatility 637 0.6162 0.2385 0.1563 0.9989
Tobin’s Q 637 1.2808 0.3719 0.5400 3.7713
Firm size 637 1.4528 1.8178 0.0027 12.1899
UPREITs 637 0.6641 0.4727 0.0000 1.0000
CFO volatility 637 19.1017 24.0679 0.0014 169.0523
ROA 637 4.0351 3.3211 8.1400 24.1000
Leverage 637 0.5640 0.2348 0.0000 1.6100
Share 637 0.0840 0.2110 0.6547 2.0357
Notes: This table presents descriptive statistics of the sample. DA is discretional accruals. ABREV is
abnormal revenue. ABCOGS is the abnormal cost of goods sold. GOSRE is gain/loss from sale
of real estate assets. Idiosyncratic volatility is the 1-R2 from the regression of REITs stock return on
market index and REITs index. Tobin’s Q is computed as a ﬁrm’s market value of assets over book
value of total assets. Firm size is the lagged total market capitalization. UPREITs is a dummy
variable indicating UPREIT status (1 if UPREIT). CFO volatility is the standard deviation of previous
three years CFO. ROA is return to assets, which is calculated as net income as a percentage of
average assets. Leverage is total debt scaled by the previous year’s total assets, Share is the
percentage change of fully diluted shares outstanding.
activity. Positive  associated with positive earnings management indicates that
greater information leads to more overstated earnings. However, two alternatives
may explain these ﬁndings. First, information asymmetry between managers and
shareholders could lead to positive coefﬁcients for . Market information is likely
to be insufﬁcient to overcome asymmetric information. On the contrary, market
scrutiny may even create excessive attention that pushes managers to overstate
earnings. Second, information asymmetry between current and future shareholders
could correspond to a positive estimated . If current shareholders are more
informed than perspective shareholders, then they may want to motivate managers
to inﬂate earnings in order to expropriate wealth from future stock investors. On
the other hand, a negative  associated with positive earnings management implies
that market scrutiny enhances information transparency. As for negative earnings
management, we expect  to be negative for REM because negative REM allows
REITs to retain funds and overcome future ﬁnancial constraints. We expect this
relationship to be much less pronounced for accruals management because its
impact on taxable income is quite minimal.122  Ambrose and Bian
We also include a set of control variables in estimating Equation (15). First, we
expect the presence of growth opportunities to inﬂuence earnings management.
REITs with growth potential often require additional capital to fund future
investment projects. If investors are unable to detect earnings management, then
managers may have an incentive to manipulate earnings in order to facilitate
successful capital offerings. We approximate investment opportunity using Tobin’s
q, which is deﬁned as:
E  D  PE i,t i,t i,t q  , (16) i,t BEAi,t
where Ei,t is the market value of common equity, Di,t is the book value of debt,
PEi,t is the book value of preferred equity, and BEAi,t is the book value of the
ﬁrm’s total asset. If earnings management leads to severe information asymmetry,
then we expect high values of qi,t to encourage positive earnings management and
discourage negative earnings management. Otherwise, larger values of Tobin’s q
should lead to greater negative earnings manipulation and lower positive earnings
manipulation.
Second, we include two measures of ﬁnancial constraint: ﬁrm size (lagged total
market capitalization) and leverage (total debt scaled by previous year’s total
assets). If larger ﬁrms are able to generate economies of scale, then they are less
likely to be ﬁnancially constrained, and thus depend less on externally generated
capital. Hence, we expect ﬁrm size to be inversely related to negative earnings
management. Higher debt-to-equity ratios signify that ﬁrms have lower future
debt capacity and may be subject to greater monitoring by debt holders. Thus,
one would expect leverage to be inversely correlated with negative earnings
management.
Third, the incentive to overstate earnings may be stronger following equity
issuance. Thus, we include Share, the percentage change in fully diluted shares
outstanding, as a control variable to capture changes in ﬁrm equity positions. The
utilization of fully diluted shares rather than common shares has the advantage of
capturing the effect of issuing operating units by umbrella partnership real estate
investment trusts (UPREITs). We also control for cash ﬂow volatility. Bradley,
Capozza, and Seguin (1998) show that cash ﬂow volatility is negatively related to
dividends. We measure cash ﬂow volatility as the standard deviation of the
previous three years’ cash ﬂow from operation (CFO volatility). Following Yu
(2007), we also control for the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability by including return to assets
(ROA), which is calculated as net income as a percentage of average assets. Finally,
to capture any structural differences between UPREITs and regular REITs, we
include an indicator variable, UPREITs (1 for UPREITs, 0 otherwise). All control
variables are winsorized at the tails of 0.5% and 99.5% to limit extreme values.Stock Market Information and REIT Earnings  123
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 Results
To focus on the correlation between earnings management and idiosyncratic stock
return volatility, we ﬁrst conduct a univariate comparison of means and medians
of idiosyncratic stock return volatility across suspected EM and non-EM ﬁrms.
Panel A of Exhibit 5 shows the comparison for accruals management (DA). The
p-values for the difference in means tests suggest that idiosyncratic stock return
volatility is correlated with positive accruals management; however, the
differences in medians are not signiﬁcant. With respect to negative earnings
management, we ﬁnd no difference between suspected EM and non-EM ﬁrms.
Panels B, C, and D in Exhibit 5 show the results for the REM proxies (ABREV,
ABCOGS, and GOSRE, respectively). Most noticeably, we see that, for the
negative EM ﬁrms, the mean and median differences are highly signiﬁcant for the
three proxies of REM, indicating that greater idiosyncratic stock return volatility
is strongly correlated with negative real earnings management. In contrast, we ﬁnd
no consistent evidence across the three REM proxies that positive EM is linked
to idiosyncratic stock return volatility.18
Accruals Management
We formally explore the interaction between stock return volatility and earnings
management by estimating Equation (15). Exhibit 6 shows the estimated
coefﬁcients from the ﬁxed-effects, panel regression where the dependent variable
is accruals management (DA). After controlling for relevant factors, the estimated
coefﬁcient for idiosyncratic stock return volatility is negatively correlated (at the
5% statistical signiﬁcance level) with negative accruals management. The ﬁnding
of an inverse relation between idiosyncratic stock return volatility and negative
accrual-based earnings management is consistent with the monitoring hypothesis
that ﬁrms are less likely to engage in earnings management activity when stock
market information is high.
The estimated coefﬁcients for the control variables in Exhibit 6 display patterns
that are consistent with our prior expectations. As a proxy of future investment
opportunity, the estimated coefﬁcients for Tobin’s q are negatively related to
positive EM (at the 5% level) and positively related to negative EM (at the 1%
level). Thus, we do not ﬁnd evidence that REIT managers attempt to obtain cheap
outside ﬁnancing by overstating ﬁrm proﬁtability, which is consistent with the
previous result that earnings management does not generate signiﬁcant information
asymmetry. In contrast, favorable investment opportunities appear to increase the
probability of negative earnings management. This is consistent with REITs
accumulating ﬁnancial slack via negative earnings management in order to take
advantage of future investment opportunities.
The two variables measuring ﬁnancial constraint, ﬁrm size and leverage,a r e
negatively associated with negative earnings manipulations. As shown in Exhibit124  Ambrose and Bian
Exhibit 5  Mean and Median between Suspected EM and non-EM Samples
EM Firm Non-EM Firm Diff. p-value
Panel A: Suspected EM & non-EM ﬁrms identiﬁed by DA
Positive EM Mean 0.6550 0.6103 0.0447 0.0644
Median 0.6534 0.6003 0.0531 0.3030
Negative EM Mean 0.6080 0.6210 0.0131 0.5668
Median 0.6132 0.6025 0.0106 0.6000
Panel B: Suspected EM & non-EM ﬁrms identiﬁed by ABREV
Positive EM Mean 0.6717 0.6073 0.0644 0.0165
Median 0.6645 0.5737 0.1388 0.0110
Negative EM Mean 0.7477 0.5863 0.1614 0.0000
Median 0.8277 0.6074 0.2203 0.0000
Panel C: Suspected EM & non-EM ﬁrms identiﬁed by ABCOGS
Positive EM Mean 0.6372 0.6105 0.0266 0.2439
Median 0.6258 0.5927 0.0330 0.4270
Negative EM Mean 0.6983 0.6018 0.0965 0.0002
Median 0.6904 0.5731 0.1173 0.0050
Panel D: Suspected EM & non-EM ﬁrms identiﬁed by GOSRE
Positive EM Mean 0.5957 0.6211 0.0255 0.2973
Median 0.5636 0.6128 0.0492 0.3770
Negative EM Mean 0.6518 0.5885 0.0633 0.0011
Median 0.6509 0.5640 0.0868 0.0280
Notes: This table compares mean and median between suspected EM and non-EM samples
identiﬁed via our four measures of earnings management (DA, ABREV, GOSRE,a n dABCOGS).
We classify REIT i as a positive EM ﬁrm if DAi,t, ABREVi,t,a n dGOSREi,t are in the top quintile and
ABCOGSi,t is in the bottom quintile. Similarly, we classify REIT i as a negative EM ﬁrm if DAi,t,
ABREi,t,a n dGOSREi,t are in the bottom quintile and ABCOGSi,t is in the top quintile. Panels A
through D are respectively compare mean and median between suspected EM and non-EM
samples based on DA, ABREV, ABCOGS,a n dGOSRE. p-values of Wilcoxon Rank-Sum test and
Median test are computed for mean and median differences.
6, the regression coefﬁcient of lagged ﬁrm size is positive (signiﬁcant at the 5%
level) for positive earnings management and negative (signiﬁcant at the 1% level)
for negative earnings management. We also see that the coefﬁcient for leverage
is negative (signiﬁcant at the 5% level) for negative earnings management.
Collectively, these results conﬁrm our expectation that ﬁnancially constrained
ﬁrms are more likely to engage in negative earnings management.Stock Market Information and REIT Earnings  125
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Exhibit 6  Accrual Management: EM and Non-EM Firms
DA
Dependent Variable Positive EM Negative EM
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.2165 1.3640**
(0.7447) (0.0446)
Tobin’s Q 0.9914** 1.7050***
(0.0102) (0.0000)














Firm ﬁxed-effect Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed-effect Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.0959 0.1287
Notes: This table presents regression of accruals management (identiﬁed using DA)o n
idiosyncratic volatility. We classify REIT i as a positive EM ﬁrm if DAi,t is in the top quintile.
Similarly, we classify REIT i as a negative EM ﬁrm if DAi,t is in the bottom quintile. p-values,
computed using White standard error (White, 1980), are shown in parentheses below each
regression coefﬁcient. The number of observations is 616.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
We also note that the estimated coefﬁcients for UPREITs are signiﬁcant at the 1%
level and indicate that UPREITs are less likely to engage in positive earnings
management and more likely to engage in negative earnings management. Finally,
we note that the negative and signiﬁcant (at the 5% level) coefﬁcient for ROA
suggests that ﬁrms with higher returns on assets are less likely to engage in
negative earnings management.126  Ambrose and Bian
Real Earnings Management
Exhibit 7 shows the results for the REM proxies. Consistent with the univariate
analysis, the statistically signiﬁcant correlation between greater idiosyncratic stock
return volatility and negative REM persists for all three REM measures.19
However, the regression results indicate that positive REM is not signiﬁcantly
correlated with idiosyncratic stock return volatility.20
Similar to the results of the accruals-based measure of earnings management, we
see that the estimated coefﬁcients for Tobin’s q are positively related (at the 5%
and 1% levels, respectively) to negative EM for the ABREV- and GOSRE-based
measures. This implies that REITs are more likely to perform negative REM when
expected future investment is good, and is consistent with the regulatory cost
hypothesis. Relatively abundant market information makes raising capital via
overstated earnings difﬁcult. In contrast, negative REM reduces dividend payout
and may potentially help relax future ﬁnancial constraint. Consistent with our
expectation, larger and highly levered ﬁrms appear to perform less negative
earnings management. Correlations between ﬁrm size and all three REM measures
are negative, though only GOSRE is statistically signiﬁcant (at the 1% level).
Firms with high leverage are less likely to have low abnormal revenue (signiﬁcant
at the 10% level). Finally, we ﬁnd UPREITs tend to perform less positive REM.
 Robustness Checks
Measurement
Obviously, our interpretation builds upon the fact that idiosyncratic volatility
serves as a valid proxy of private information capitalized into stock prices.
Although an array of studies have offered empirical support to this measurement,
we are also aware of the existence of some counter arguments. For example, West
(1988) indicates that high idiosyncratic volatility may be associated with poor
information. In addition, Teoh, Yang, and Zhang (2008) ﬁnd that ﬁrms with greater
idiosyncratic volatility are more susceptible to accounting anomalies, which are
likely outcomes of information asymmetry. Given that most of these studies are
examining general industrial trends, we feel it is necessary to verify whether the
positive correlation between idiosyncratic volatility and stock informativeness also
prevails in the REIT industry. Speciﬁcally, we perform the test speciﬁed by
Dumev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003). We construct information measures,
FERC and FINC, based on REIT property types via estimating Equation (9)
annually for each REIT property type, and FERC and FINC are similarly
constructed in (10) and (11). If ﬁrm-speciﬁc stock price movements reﬂect the
capitalization of private information, then greater idiosyncratic volatility will
correspond to the increased availability of private information. Therefore, ﬁrms






























































Exhibit 7  Idiosyncratic Volatility
ABREV ABCOGS GOSRE
Dependent Variable Positive EM Negative EM Positive EM Negative EM Positive EM Negative EM
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.0135 3.7655*** 0.5764 1.1570* 0.6074 1.0731**
(0.9839) (0.0000) (0.3823) (0.0883) (0.2971) (0.0378)
Tobin’s Q 0.2212 0.7061** 0.1471 0.0299 0.5138 1.0540***
(0.5865) (0.0423) (0.6733) (0.9428) (0.1547) (0.0009)
Firm size 0.0427 0.1702 0.0912 0.1197 0.0616 0.2330***
(0.6725) (0.2988) (0.2962) (0.3781) (0.4562) (0.0023)
UPREITs 0.1277 0.0329 0.9156*** 0.1164 0.6151*** 0.3164
(0.6651) (0.8981) (0.0021) (0.6676) (0.0092) (0.1675)
CFO volatility 0.0040 0.0074 0.0075 0.0050 0.0007 0.0022
(0.5543) (0.2762) (0.2364) (0.4784) (0.8928) (0.6924)
ROA 0.0151 0.0300 0.0654 0.0695 0.0025 0.0025
(0.7475) (0.4556) (0.1095) (0.1773) (0.9509) (0.9394)
Leverage 0.8196 1.1127* 0.1204 0.7462 0.2475 0.0642
(0.1035) (0.0683) (0.8032) (0.1083) (0.5806) (0.8755)
Share 1.3937** 2.1187*** 0.6927 3.4500*** 0.6983 1.4209***


















Exhibit 7  (continued)
Idiosyncratic Volatility
ABREV ABCOGS GOSRE
Dependent Variable Positive EM Negative EM Positive EM Negative EM Positive EM Negative EM
Intercept 1.5878** 3.7705*** 0.9666 1.8512** 0.2135 1.7247**
(0.0409) (0.0000) (0.2107) (0.0204) (0.7902) (0.0118)
Firm ﬁxed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed-effect Pseudo R2 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pseudo R2 0.1424 0.1664 0.1202 0.1216 0.0441 0.1269
Notes: This table presents regression of REM (identiﬁed using ABREV, ABCOGS,a n dGOSRE) on idiosyncratic volatility. We classify REIT i as a positive EM
ﬁrm if ABREVi,t,a n dGOSRE i,t are in the top quintile and ABCOGSi,t, is in the bottom quintile. We classify REIT i as a negative EM ﬁrm if ABREVi,t,a n d
GOSREii,t, are in the bottom quintile and ABCOGSi,t, is in the top quintile. p-values, computed using White standard error (White, 1980), are shown in
parentheses below each regression coefﬁcient. The number of observations for ABREV and ABCOGS is 637. The number of observations for GOSRE is 630.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.Stock Market Information and REIT Earnings  129
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Exhibit 8  Effects of Stock-price Informativeness on Average Idiosyncratic Volatility of REIT Property Types
FERC FINC
Model 8.1 8.2
Idiosyncratic volatility 13.902** 1.052***
(0.04) (0.00)
Number of ﬁrms 0.117 0.024***
(0.35) (0.00)
Average ﬁrm size 1.964* 0.109**
(0.06) (0.03)
Past earning volatility 0.303 2.584**
(0.99) (0.02)
Future dividend explanatory power 1.059 0.029
($0.70) ($0.83)




R2/Pseudo R2 0.165 0.565
Notes: This table reports regression results of stock-price informativeness on average idiosyncratic
volatility of REIT property types. The seven REITs property types are diversiﬁed, health care, hotel,
multifamily, ofﬁce, retail, and other. Model 8.1 is estimated using FERC as the dependent variable.
Model 8.2 is estimated using FINC as the dependent variable. For all speciﬁcations, ﬁrm and time
random effects are included. p-values are shown in parentheses below each regression coefﬁcient.
Pseudo R2 for models using FERC are computed to establish comparability between models with
FERC and FINC. The number of observations is 49.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
more closely aligned with fundamental values. As a result, stock prices should
exhibit superior predictive power on future earnings. Thus, we estimate panel
regressions of FERC and FINC on property-level average idiosyncratic volatility.
We also include the set of control variables identiﬁed in (12) and (13).
Exhibit 8 presents the estimated coefﬁcients for the regression of FERC and FINC
on property-level average idiosyncratic volatility. We see that idiosyncratic
volatility is positively (signiﬁcant at the 5% level) correlated with both information
measures. This result is consistent with Dumev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin
(2003), who also report a strong correlation between idiosyncratic stock return
volatility and stock price informativeness. It also appears that FINC is more
correlated with idiosyncratic volatility than FERC. Not only does idiosyncratic130  Ambrose and Bian
volatility show greater statistical signiﬁcance in the FINC model, a signiﬁcantly
larger portion of FINC can be explained via our regression model. This result
indicates that the general industrial trend identiﬁed by Durnev et al. (2003) also
prevails in the REIT industry. Idiosyncratic volatility is attributable to private
information on ﬁrm fundamentals. Hence, our use of idiosyncratic volatility as a
measure of private information is supported.
Other Specifications
As a ﬁnal robustness check, we estimate Equation (15) using continuous measures
of earnings management, DA, ABREV, ABCOGS, and GOSRE, and examine an
alternative earnings management measure. First, we regress the earnings
management measure on idiosyncratic volatility together with the same set of
control variables included Equation (15). We estimate the model via ﬁxed-effect
regression. As shown in Exhibit 9, the results are consistent with our previous
results. Aside from the fact that GOSRE lost its signiﬁcance, greater idiosyncratic
volatility appears to be negatively correlated with abnormal revenue and associated
with high abnormal cost.
Next, we construct an additional REM measure based on the difference between
REIT funds from operations (FFO) and the change in cash holdings.21 The
rationale for this measure is that REIT managers may divert cash from FFO. Thus,
a larger difference between FFO and the change in cash holdings may suggest
greater earnings management. We scale this difference by FFO and repeat the
previous analysis using this measure. We ﬁnd no evidence that this measure is
correlated with our stock informativeness measures, FERC and FINC,o r
idiosyncratic volatility.22
Since we are using idiosyncratic stock return volatility of current period, the
validity our interpretation may be jeopardized by the endogeneity problem that
earnings management may affect idiosyncratic volatility. In other words, earnings
management may somehow lead to greater idiosyncratic volatility. However, as
earnings management mitigates accounting transparency, it should reduce the
amount of private information embedded in stock price rather than increasing it.
Thus, the endogeneity problem is more likely to work against our interpretation
by making our main ﬁndings less pronounced. In addition, if this endogeneity
issue does exist, there is no reason to believe only negative REM can affect
idiosyncratic volatility. The fact that positive earnings management is not
correlated with idiosyncratic volatility reduces our concern on the potential
endogeneity problem. Finally, our main results do not change if we use lagged
idiosyncratic stock return volatility as a measure of embedded information. In this
case, discretionary accruals are still negatively related to idiosyncratic volatility.
Although GOSRE lost its signiﬁcance, the correlation between idiosyncratic
volatility and negative REM persists for the other measures.Stock Market Information and REIT Earnings  131
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Exhibit 9  Effects of Earnings Management on Idiosyncratic Volatility
DA ABREV ABCOGS GOSRE
Idiosyncratic Volatility 0.0038 0.0611*** 0.0129** 0.0006
(0.6004) (0.0001) (0.0350) (0.8277)
Tobin’s Q 0.0234*** 0.0124 0.0042 0.0020
(0.0001) (0.3393) (0.4572) (0.3323)
Firm Size 0.0034*** 0.0012 0.0008 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.4973) 0.3482 0.6334
UPREITs 0.0168*** 0.0075 0.0099*** 0.0048***
(0.0000) (0.2017) (0.0015) (0.0005)
CFO volatility 0.0001* 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000
(0.0616) (0.5887) (0.1449) (0.7310)
ROA 0.0009 0.0003 0.0015*** 0.0003
(0.1751) (0.8305) (0.0093) (0.2089)
Leverage 0.0123** 0.0188 0.0007 0.0015
(0.0373) (0.1280) (0.9058) (0.4148)
 Share 0.0038 0.0284** 0.0132*** 0.0035**
(0.4924) (0.0210) (0.0009) (0.0144)
Intercept 0.0274** 0.0446 0.0002 0.0146***
(0.0194) (0.0609) (0.9860) (0.0006)
Firm ﬁxed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ﬁxed-effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.1369 0.1026 0.1210 0.0921
This table presents regression of continuous measures of earnings management, DA, ABREV,
ABCOGS,a n dGOSRE, on idiosyncratic volatility. p-values, computed using White standard error
(White, 1980), are shown in parentheses below each regression coefﬁcient. The number of
observations for DA is 616. The number of observations for ABREV and ABCOGS is 637. The
number of observations for GOSRE is 630.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10% level.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5% level.
***Signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
 Conclusion
We examine the interaction between stock price movement and earnings
management using REIT data. Speciﬁcally, we empirically address two questions.
First, are investors able to ‘‘see through’’ earnings management? Second, how
does stock price movement inﬂuence earnings management. We study the ﬁrst
question by comparing stock-price informativeness across suspected EM and non-
EM ﬁrms. The informativeness of suspected EM ﬁrms’stock price does not appear132  Ambrose and Bian
to be systematically less than that of non-EM ﬁrms. Hence, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that stock investors are capable of detecting earnings management, as
well as understand its implication on ﬁrm value.
We address the second question by examining the correlation between earnings
management and private information embedded in stock prices. We apply
idiosyncratic stock return volatility as a measurement of embedded private
information. Our main ﬁnding is that greater idiosyncratic stock return volatility
is associated with negative REM. This result is robust to alternative proxies of
earnings management, as well as model speciﬁcations. To validate the use of
idiosyncratic volatility as a measure of stock market information, we ﬁnd the
industrial pattern identiﬁed by Dumev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) prevails
in the REIT industry. That is, greater idiosyncratic stock return volatility is
associated with greater stock informativeness. Hence, our result implies that
greater stock market information leads to negative earnings management.
Our answers to both questions are consistent with the regulatory cost hypothesis
that negative REM allows REITs to circumvent the mandatory dividend payout
requirement and build up ﬁnancial slack for future investment. The feasibility of
this practice relies on the abundance of private information embedded in REIT
stock prices. Modest earnings reports are promoted when shareholders understand
and appreciate the intent of REM. We show that REIT managers are motivated to
reduce regulatory costs when stronger feedback effects are generated by stock
price volatility.
Our result is consistent with the literature showing that greater embedded
information in stock prices promotes efﬁcient capital allocation. In particular, our
result suggests an explanation to the fact that ﬁrm investments are more responsive
to investment opportunity when stock market information is relatively abundant
(Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007). Information feedback from stock market
trading may enable managers to more accurately forecast future opportunities.
 Endnotes
1 Corporate decisions inﬂuenced by stock trading include capital budgeting (Chen,
Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007) and CEO turnovers (Lehn and Zhao, 2006).
2 Our deﬁnition of market efﬁciency implies that stock prices incorporate public and
private information; this deﬁnition assumes the presence of ‘informed’ investors. One
proxy for the presence of informed investors is the level of institutional ownership
(Utama and Cready, 1997; and Ali, Klasa, and Li, 2008), and institutional investors
represent a signiﬁcant ownership clientele for REIT stocks.
3 Although the minimum dividend payout requirement is not a binding constraint for most
REITs, a number of incentives still exist for managers to perform negative earnings
management even if their REIT’s payout ratio is above the 90% mark. First, managers
may value dividend consistency and be unwilling to increase dividends to a level that
is not sustainable (Lintner, 1956). Second, the mandatory dividend payout requirement
may reduce the stability of dividend policy for ﬁrms that pay the minimum requiredStock Market Information and REIT Earnings  133
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dividend. For instance, unexpectedly high taxable income could lead to greater dividend
payouts that may not be sustainable. Thus, negative earnings management would allow
REIT managers to withhold cash and ensure a consistent dividend policy. In fact, ﬁrms
often devote resources to smooth dividends. For example, Aharony and Swary (1980)
show that ﬁrms may borrow during troughs in the business cycle in order to maintain
normal dividend level.
4 See Healy and Wahlen (1999) for a review of studies related to regulatory motivations
of earnings management. Hand (1993) discusses the tax considerations associated with
earnings management with respect to FIFO versus LIFO accounting treatment.
5 See Jensen and Meckling (1976) for a discussion on the risk-shifting problem and Myers
(1977) for the debt overhang problem.
6 SNL coverage begins in 1990.
7 The seven REIT property types are diversiﬁed, health care, hotel, multifamily, ofﬁce,
retail, and other.
8 Data from 1996 to 1998 are needed for variable constructions.
9 Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) show that the modiﬁed Jones model outperforms
other models in the accuracy of detecting accruals management. Discretionary accruals
is a commonly-used proxy for accruals management (Teoh, Welch and Wong, 1998a,
1998b; Gong, Louis, and Sun, 2008; and Yu, 2007).
10 Our estimate of DAi,t is expressed as a percentage of lagged total assets.
11 Our concentration on these three methods of earnings management is based on the fact
that manipulations of other discretionary items, such as R&D, are less relevant for
REITs.
12 Edelstein, Liu, and Tsang (2007) include a dummy variable indicating revenue losses
in the previous year and its interaction with REVi,t in their estimation of abnormal costs
to account for the ‘‘stickiness’’of costs. For robustness check, we adopt this speciﬁcation
when estimating (5). The results are similar.
13 Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) report their result based on   3. They
also report that including one more year or one less year in (9) does not qualitatively
change their result. We set  equal to 2, because some REIT property-type groups contain
a small number of ﬁrms in early years, and we do not have enough degrees of freedom
to estimate (9) with   3.
14 If b1 and b2 are both greater than zero, then the explanatory power of future earnings
on current returns extends to both years, and FERC equals b1  b2.I fb1 is greater than
0 and b2 is less than zero, then we assume that the explanatory power is limited only
to next year’s earnings, and FERC equals b1. Finally, if b1 and b2 are both less than
zero, then we assume that future earnings have virtually no explanatory power on current
returns, and thus FERC equals zero.
15 See Basu (1997) and Durnev, Morck, Yeung, and Zarowin (2003) for detailed discussion
on the use of stock return to control for earning timeliness effect.
16 We obtain similar results using other quintiles as the control group.
17 Our results are similar if FINC is replaced with the logarithm of FINC.
18 The exception is the REM measure, abnormal revenue (ABREV), where Panel B shows
that idiosyncratic stock return volatility is higher in suspected EM ﬁrms.
19 Idiosyncratic volatility appears to have distinct impacts on both accruals management
and REM. Greater idiosyncratic volatility leads to less accruals management but more134  Ambrose and Bian
REM. This result is consistent with our hypothesis that the main incentive of REM is
to reduce taxable income. This purpose is unlikely fulﬁlled via accruals management
due to its minimal impact on taxable income.
20 To avoid giving excess weight to ﬁrms with more observations, we also weight each
ﬁrm-year observation by 1/T, where T is the number of observations of the ﬁrm during
our sample period. Our results are unaffected by this modiﬁcation.
21 We thank David Shulman for suggesting this alternative measure.
22 The results of these regressions are available from the authors.
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